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Abstract 
 
This paper studies the long-term relationship between economic growth and institutional change. 
Using a dynamic panel data model, several tests are conducted to test for both long- and short-
term movements in GDP, and institutional quality using annual data from 87 countries ranging 
from 1984 to 2016. This paper contributes with an econometric approach to long-term GDP 
change theory as several tests are conducted for both general long-term effects of institutional 
reform on GDP growth, geography-specific effects and an interaction test of productivity’s and 
institutional reforms’ combined effect on economic activity. This paper finds that both improved 
political- and economic institutional quality raise long-term innovation-driven growth. The causal 
relationship is found to be in the direction from institutional reform to economic growth. 
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1. Introduction 
What characterises the last century compared to previous centuries is the pace of change (Schön, 
2006). Since the first industrial revolution in the middle of the 19th century, the world economy has 
expanded at an unprecedented pace. However, the progress has not been linear but rather a cyclical 
process where the economy moves up and down, but persistently upwards over time. The growth 
rate has varied widely over time across longer periods than classical business cycles. Sustained 
periods of high growth have been followed by sustained periods of low growth (Piatier, 1981; Hall 
and Preston, 1988; Andersson, 2016). For instance, world GDP per capita growth averaged around 
2.2 percent during the 1980s and 1.1 percent during the 1990s (World Bank). The underlying cause 
of these long waves in growth is often accredited to technological change (OECD, 2003; 
Andersson, 2016). Historical data indicate that innovation and productivity change tend to vary in 
longer periods ranging around 30-60 years, a pattern that could explain much of the long term 
economic changes (Berry, 1991; Schön, 2006).  
 
A growing literature also stresses the importance of economic and political institutions (Bergh and 
Karlsson, 2010; Berry, 1991; Schön, 2006). During the last nearly 200 years the liberalisation of 
economies, markets and borders has increased, and consequently economic activity (Schön, 2006). 
Ever since the first one, industrialised economies have gone through several technological 
revolutions (Piatier, 1981; Schön, 2006), each of which has introduced a new techno-economic 
paradigm with a new set of generic technologies, infrastructure and organisational principles that 
have changed and modernised societies (Perez, 2007). At the end of the diffusion process, 
economies have entered long run structural crises with declining growth rates and increasing 
unemployment (Perez, 2007). Although increasing unemployment, and stagnant wages impose a 
welfare loss at the time, these periods have historically marked important turning points when new 
disruptive innovations have had their breakthroughs, causing growth to eventually increase again 
(Devezas, Linstone and Santons, 2005; Schön, 2006; Perez, 2007). Nevertheless, these revolutions 
might not just affect the supply side of the economy, but also institutions, countries’ economic 
systems, and ultimately how people live their lives (Perez, 2007). A similar S-shaped movement 
seems to account for public opinions and the view of nationalism versus globalism, resulting in 
theories that the same long wave movement comes for institutions (Berry, 1991). However, these 
theories tend to be theoretical and lack empirical backing.  
 
Therefore, this essay tests the direction of causality between institutional reform and long-term 
changes in GDP. In other words, whether long term changes in GDP could be explained by 
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institutional reform, or if long term changes in the economy cause institutional change between the 
years 1984 to 2016. Searching for Granger causality in a dynamic panel data set of 87 countries, 
several tests are conducted. First, the relationship between long- and short-term institutional 
improvement and GDP growth is tested with GDP as the dependent variable, then the reverse 
with the individual institution as the dependent variable. As there might be a covariant relationship 
between innovation and institutional reform, where they depend on each other to cause substantial 
GDP growth, this relationship is tested. Finally, tests are conducted for different economic regions 
as there might be different patterns and relationships depending on the degree of economic 
development in different regions in the world.  
 
Significant coefficients are found for changes in political and economic institutional quality, 
regulatory freedom and openness to trade causing growth. Results also show that reforms 
improving political and economic institutional quality both raise long-term innovation driven 
growth. Separate continent- and country-group specific effects are also found indicating that long-
term change and institutional improvements have different effects on different economies 
depending on the degree of economic development. As no significant relationship between long-
term change in GDP causing institutional reform is found, the general causal relationship is from 
institution to economic growth.   
 
The rest of this thesis has the following disposition: Section 2 covers the background and theory 
of long-term growth and institutional quality, section 3 describes our hypotheses and how these 
will be tested, section 4 describes our data, its statistical characteristics and our use of method, 
section 5 presents our estimated results, which are analysed in section 6, and finally section 7 
presents our conclusions.  
 
2. Background 
Since the late 19th century most of economic growth theory has focused on gradual equilibrium 
growth. In contrast to the theories of Schumpeter and as stated by Alfred Marshall “natura non 
facit saltum” – or “nature doesn’t jump” (Marshall, 1892; Mensch, 2006). For the past five decades, 
the basic neoclassical Solow-Swan growth model has been the principal for macroeconomic 
analysis. The model explains GDP as a variable of capital investment, human capital and 
technological development where GDP growth is an endogenous factor with a natural equilibrium 
state (Knight, Loayza and Villanueva, 1993). The Solow-Swan growth model predicts that in steady-
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state equilibrium the level of per capita income will be determined by the prevailing technology, as 
embodied in the production function, and by the savings rate, population growth and technological 
progress. Such models predict a natural rate of growth where the role for policymakers is to avoid 
major deviations from the potential growth path. However, technological innovations and their 
effects on the economy rarely move in a linear pattern but rather in a S-shaped form (Berry, 1991; 
Schön, 2006). This phenomenon was first introduced by Nikolai Kondratieff who drew attention 
to them in 1925, using data on prices, wages and interest rates, as well as industrial production and 
consumption from France, Great Britain and the United States (Schön, 2006). Kondratieff’s theory, 
which later came to be called Kondratieff cycles, was based around the waves of price fluctuations 
that could be observed from late 18th century to the early 1920s. By observing the relative prices of 
agricultural and industrial products he claimed that the rising prices of agricultural products led to 
the expansion of the rest of the economy during a capitalist system (Schön, 2006). The notion that 
the economy moves in long cycles was later adapted by Joseph Schumpeter who claimed that 
outstanding and revolutionary technological innovations came in clusters and triggered economic 
upswings.  
 
Using time-series of important indicators of general economic activity, it seems clear that long-
term growth covering several business cycles, in developed countries and worldwide, is not steady 
and there are successive phases of accelerating and decelerating growth ending in recessions just to 
be followed by a new period of growth (Metz, 2005). World GDP per capita has moved from an 
average growth pace of 3.5 percent during the 1970s to 1.4 percent during the 1990s and now most 
recently an average of around 1.6 percent during the 2010s. After each of downturn the economy 
has bounced back and through the ashes of old firms and markets new products and companies 
have risen (Berry, 1991). In addition, through these shocks in the economy, countries’ economic 
institutions are reformed. As economies face financial crises and banking crises often linked to 
recessions, the political urgency for institutional reform increases (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; 
Andersson, 2016). Throughout history it has not primarily been after the first breakthrough of a 
technology that growth and disruption starts, but rather after the technology has been given time 
to mature and develop further (Schön, 2006). For instance, the first idea of the internet was drafted 
in 1962 and the first forms of internet was developed already in the early 1980s (Internet society, 
1997), but its effect on the wider economy only started to emerge as late as the mid-1990s. In the 
early stage of an invention there are clear limits as the knowledge on how to use it is narrow and 
perhaps the infrastructure and common standards are yet to be imposed. This restricts the scope 
of the invention in its early stages. This time lag between initial invention, and widespread adoption 
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and economic effect has lately been suggested to explain the so-called productivity paradox 
regarding the internet (Schön, 2006).  
 
Between these waves of innovations, a remarkably timely distance occurs of around 30-60 years. 
Each of these clusters of innovation were developed during deflationary growth cycles, such as the 
most recent one (Berry, 1991). Each cluster produces significant growth in both GDP, productivity 
and in prices. However, this paper argues that these innovations were not the result of individual 
spurious innovation but rather an effect of surrounding factors (Hall and Preston, 1988, Berry, 
1991 and Schön, 2006). Organizational-, institutional-, financial market- and state action all played 
a crucial role. Each of these innovations were also dependent on the development of infrastructural 
developments such as railways, electricity grids, highways, airports, education and access to 
investments. This required both high levels of capitalization, infrastructure and technical 
standardization (Berry, 1991). Some argue that the key innovation is venture capital itself (Berry, 
1991).  
 
Longer economic time series show an economic movement in long S-shaped cycles in three stages: 
innovation, rationalization, and crisis. Through this process first a new set of innovations that 
create new products, services and markets, comes a second phase of rationalization where the same 
innovation is used to increase the productivity of existing products and services. However, history 
seems to also show a third phase, namely the “bust-phase”. The years before a crisis are 
characterized by rationalization and cost minimization primarily for established and often 
longstanding companies, products and markets. This ultimately comes to an end, where the lack of 
renewal forces the old firms to either reinvent or go bankrupt. However, during this phase 
investments would still be high as capital levels continue to increase and ultimately – as the 
investments in unprofitable businesses run short – a recession occurs.  It takes such a crisis for 
new technology to have its full breakthrough and for the economy to once again focus on renewal 
and innovation rather than rationalization (Schön, 2006).  This pattern seems to be reoccurring as 
the world have experienced several structural crises such as the late 1840s, beginning of the 1890s, 
early 1930s, the middle of the 1970s and now most recently during the financial crisis that erupted 
in 2008. During the latest global financial crisis, a contributing factor was the easy credits allowed, 
causing increasing asset prices and unsubstantial debt levels (Schwartz, 2009).  
 
These technological steps can be called general-purpose technologies (Schön, 2008) or macro-
innovations. Such a technology first spreads to most sectors of the economy, then improves over 
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time and finally facilitates invention and creates new products and processes.  Such innovations are 
rare, there are only two such technologies during the last two centuries; electricity and ICT 
(Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2006). The implementation of such a disruptive technology requires two 
development waves: in the first cycle, the innovation affects the production process, and in the 
second development it creates a “revolution in consumer products” (Tunzelmann, 2003; Perez, 
2007). This long-term economic movement is not a singular event but rather several parallel 
processes. As one technique’s potential is maximized another develops (Perez, 2007). This pattern 
is illustrated below in figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. Illustration of long-change movements in innovation and productivity 
 
Source: Perez, 2007 
 
Modern econometrics has found mixed results regarding econometric time-series proof of long-
wave movements but robust evidence has been found for clusters of economic activity (Metz, 2005; 
Devezas, Linstone and Santons, 2005). Summarizing for innovations from 1750 to 1991 show 
clusters of innovation peaking in 1840, 1890, 1935 and 1986. Mapping these clusters together with 
economic activity has shown a lagged upswing in growth with a time-lag about 18 years (Mensch, 
1979; Metz, 2005). Innovation clusters that lie well in line with famous innovations. Before 1800 
the mechanization and automatization of the textile industry caused a first industrial 
transformation. Steel and electricity together caused up and downswings from around 1850 to 
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1920. Oil and subsequent technologies caused a third technological upswing ranging around 1920 
to 1970. Since then the latest wave of innovation has clearly been information and data techniques 
resulting in automation and efficient communications starting about 1970 to the present (Perez, 
1983; Linstone and Mitroff, 1994; Devezas, Linstone and Santons, 2005).  
 
During these clusters of innovation different countries progress during different eras as 
innovations seem to start in some core countries that become technological leaders and then their 
innovations spread to other countries. For example, the leaders in the steam powered 
transportation era were Britain, France, Belgium, the United states of America, and Germany, and 
the followers were Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Austria–Hungary. The technological 
leaders of today are the U.S., Japan, the European countries, Canada, Australia, South Korea and 
Taiwan (Devezas, Linstone and Santons, 2005). This indicate that there are country-specific factors 
that contribute to a country’s ability to adapt and nurture innovation and growth.  
 
Over the last 30 years, information and communications technology (ICT) has been the main 
technological engine behind growth in the world economy (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2006; Perez, 
2007). But, there are signs showing that the speed of growth caused by ICT is slowing down. For 
example, in 1985 the rate of return of one unit of ICT capital was 5 times higher than the rate of 
return on other productive capital (Andersson and Karpestam, 2012). Following a large expansion 
of the ICT capital stock, the rate of return compared to other kinds of capital was reduced to 1 in 
2007 (EU KLEMS). 
 
Table 1. Average productivity growth  
US Total Factor Productivity  Swedish Labour Productivity Growth 
Year Average annual growth rate Year Average annual growth rate 
1870-1900  1.5%-2% 1896-1910 1.5% 
1900-1920  1% 1910-1935 2.9% 
1920s  2% 1935-1950 2.1% 
1930s  3% 1950-1975 5.4% 
1940s  2.5% 1975-1990 2.3% 
1950-1973  2% 1990-2005 5.9% 
1973-1990  < 1%   
1990s  > 1% 1896-2005 3.0% 
2000s  1.5% 
  
Source: Shackleton (2013) and Schön (2006: Schön (1990) and Swedish Statistics) 
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Table 1 shows that a similar pattern can be seen for longer series of productivity as clear wave-like 
movements occur.  Just as for TFP, when examining GDP there are clear patterns of waves. By 
smoothing for yearly averages, extreme values can be avoided, and trends shown (Berry, 1991). 
Figure 2 shows the computed nine-year average and the annual change of real GDP in the UK 
since 1710, and throughout history its economy has persistently moved in waves. Previous studies 
of long waves have not included the latest years surrounding the financial crisis of 2009. But, as 
seen in figure 3, also the latest years’ economic turbulence can be understood through long-term 
change theory. This suggest that it is not a matter of statistical coincidence but rather the economy 
moves in trends and the smoothing technique tracks underlying movements in the growth rate by 
separating signals from noise (Berry, 1991).  
 
Figure 2. Annual change in UK real GDP, 9-year moving average 
 
Source: Bank of England 
 
Plotting the latest 150 years of growth into a scale of before and after an initial deep fall in GDP 
growth shows how growth rates tend to move in 30-60 year cycles, but these cycles, at least for the 
United Kingdom, appear to be increasingly longer. Similar results have been found by Berry, Kim 
and Kim (1993) and Schön (2006).  
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Figure 3. Annual change in UK real GDP, 9-year moving average, years surrounding fall in 
GDP growth 
 
Source: Bank of England 
 
Still economic growth is not a guarantee although long-term changes exists – political factors also 
plays a big role (Berry, 1991; Bergh and Karlsson, 2010). Government size and quality has been 
debated for a long time. Recent studies suggest that there is a negative correlation between 
government size and economic growth (Fölster and Henrekson, 2001; Bergh and Karlsson 2010). 
This case is strengthened by research that show how economic and regulatory freedom cause 
growth to thrive (Dawson, 1998). Although this is a most central discussion institutional quality is 
often needed in an early phase of a country’s development. Rule of law, contract enforcement and 
non-corrupt government institutions has been found to have profound effects on growth as these 
lay out the most basic infrastructure for exchange of goods and money (Dixit, 2009). Evidence 
from Sweden and USA has also shown that stable monetary policy with functioning inflation-
control plays a central role in growth (Bergh and Karlsson, 2010). Although it is against the case of 
a smaller state, comparing the high taxed Sweden with USA at the 1980-2000 period show that 
Swedish growth exceeds American. The explanation seems to be found in inflation-control as 
Sweden lowered annual inflation from 10 to 1 percent, roughly adding another percentage point to 
average annual growth. USA, in contrast, only lowered inflation from 7.2 to 2.5 over the same 
period and a slower growth. Since the origins of Adam Smith economists has concentrated on 
comparative advantages resulting in the Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade theory. This theory states 
that the welfare gains are greater if two countries specialize on its comparative respective 
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comparative advantage rather than produce a mixed bundle of goods and then trade each surplus 
for the other’s (Feenstra, 2004) A relationship confirmed in modern studies (Lee Ha et al., 2004). 
However, ideas and influences might also be of contribution to other countries through free 
exchange of ideas and non-economic corporation. Such a friendly and open-minded state might 
very well also have positive effects on growth (Abramovitz, 1986; Dreher, 2006). 
 
3. Long term GDP-movement and institutional reform 
Exogenous growth theory today focuses on a longer-term perspective where technology and 
innovation drive growth through periods of growth and stagnation. This causes GDP growth to 
move in cyclical shapes rather than linear, also in the long run. Radical innovations can cause 
technological revolutions because these pave the way for new complementary innovations and 
activities, which reinforce each other (Schön, 2008). A structural change model is not bounded by 
limitations imposed by a general equilibrium theory, instead it includes the dynamics of structural 
instability and structural readiness for breakthroughs of innovation and exogenous events (which 
can have positive and negative effects on the economy) (Mensch, 2006). This model treats 
production not merely as a Keynesian function of investment and consumption, where output is a 
function of labour and capital input. As autonomous investors plan investments that change the 
production process within the economic subsystem the model treats investments as a function of 
expected demand. Industrial investors form dynamical expectations such that if the expected 
potential over time is non-linear but structurally stable, then it is a function that follows a unit-root, 
but if the system is unstable it follows three unit roots (Mensch, 2006). Therefore, growth is not a 
linear-function of invested capital and labour input – but rather a function of the combination of 
input and exogenous shocks.  These shocks are radical innovations that cause unit-root jumps.  
 
Not all innovations cause industrial revolutions despite having impacts on a market. To distinguish 
between the two, there are micro- and macro-innovations (Mokyr, 1994). Micro-innovations are 
improvements within the present techno-economical paradigm while macro-innovations are 
disruptive new ideas causing completely new production methods and industries (Grübler och 
Nakicenovic, 1991; Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2006). Recent literature takes this theory one step 
further, linking social and institutional development to innovation and growth. It is not guaranteed 
that macro-innovations reach their potential as they, just as any innovation and company, are 
dependent on several surrounding factors. These can be access to financing, regulatory factors as 
well as barriers of entry – broadly speaking the political institutional system. Empirical evidence 
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can be found for reforms such as environmental taxes or other reforms incentivising renewable 
energy initiating a positive effect on innovation in “green technologies”, which speeds up the 
diffusion process of existing technologies (Lanjouw and Mody, 1996; Jeffe and Palmer, 1997; 
European Environmental Agency, 2011; Andersson and Karpestam, 2012). Economic long-term 
development could therefore be just as dependent on its institutions as the institutions depend on 
the economic development. The exogenous growth model therefore takes a much more complex 
form than classical growth models, as it includes not only endogenous and exogenous factors. As 
technologies develop and old ones are being replaced by new ones, regulations and public 
infrastructure become obsolete (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995; Lipsey, 2009). In recent history 
ICT has forced policymakers to address new regulatory issues regarding both property rights and 
financial regulation. Innovations and long run economic change correspondingly stimulates 
institutional change, causing the relationship to work both ways.  
 
Although innovations tend to widely known, there are still differences in the degree of 
implementation of innovation into the economy, as some countries tend to be more prone to 
innovation than others. It might not only be a cause of technological and macroeconomic factors 
but also institutional and societal factors that contribute (Schön, 2006). Although similar fiscal and 
monetary reforms were conducted in a comparable timeframe, some European countries have had 
a higher GDP growth than other countries, explained by more significant contributions from ICT 
to GDP – strengthening the case that it is not only simple linear relations between investment in 
education and capital that nurture growth, but rather a highly-complicated relation (Andersson, 
2015).  
 
As there are clear evidence of wave patterns the question arises: what drives the other? Does policy 
change affect the real economy’s ability to innovate and implement new technology, or are there 
economic factors that force politicians to act on new policy affecting the real economy? And what 
kind of policy best enables not only the development but also the implementation of new 
techniques, creating increased growth? And how does globalisation and the degree of economic 
openness enable countries to adapt to, and gain from new technologies? To address these 
questions, four key hypotheses are outlined below. 
 
Hypothesis 1. Long-run institutional reform causes long-term improvements in economic growth.  
The economic life-cycle has been well described by Abramovitz (1986) “Catching Up, Forging 
Ahead, and Falling Behind”. Such life-cycle argues that the key to the growth is a country’s ability 
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to import and implement technology from a more technologically advanced country. The growth 
rate of a developing country will be higher than the growth rate of a developed country because 
the diminishing returns of developing countries is much lower. By employing optimal policies, the 
developing country could then exceed the developed, or forge ahead, just to become developed to 
see a developing country use their technology and grow faster. This theory also indicates that 
different institutions are required for different innovations and stages in a country’s phases of 
economic development. Prior research has found that institutional quality has growth-enhancing 
effects on GDP as a sound business climate, trustworthy political institutions and clearly defined 
property rights enhance business investment and entrepreneurship (Cavallo and Cavallo, 2010; 
Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). A similar pattern seems to occur for the opposite as recessions 
and financial crises can be caused by bad institutions and poor policy decisions (Kaminsky and 
Reinhart, 1999). Increased openness to trade and to foreign influences and ideas will in theory 
increase the probability that a country discovers or develops new technologies and inventions, 
which improves the country’s long-term growth path (Bergh and Karlsson, 2010). But does this 
relationship hold for long term improvements in GDP? Recent literature suggests that there are 
other factors in addition to traditional institutional quality that affect GDP growth, such as 
innovations arising irrespective of institutional quality, as well as human capital (Glaeser, La Pota, 
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2004; Andersson, 2015). To investigate for relationships, tests are 
conducted using both the level of public resources invested in education as well as several indexes 
measuring institutional quality for political- and macroeconomic stability, degree of political and 
economic globalisation, and the degree of regulatory freedom.  
 
Hypothesis 2. Long-changes in the economy cause growth enhancing institutional reform. 
As economies slowly accelerate or decelerate, public opinion and regulatory demand shifts. The 
invention of the internet was at first merely a new fling but today it has prompted new privacy 
legislations, intellectual property rights and border issues in terms of capital movements and much 
more. Economic activity could therefore cause changes in institutions, as well as major policy 
changes and reforms (Claessens, Klingebiel and Leaven, 2002). Studies have found that election 
results of presidents in USA are moving in a cyclical pattern as Republican presidents seem to be 
elected during low-growth periods and Democratic presidents during periods of high growth and 
rising inequality (Berry, Elliott, Harpham and Kim, 1998). This indicates that long term movement 
in the economy affects what sort of policy that are demanded by the electorate, consequently 
resulting in the election of politicians delivering reforms in such manner. Such a pattern is also 
evident in the relationship between slow economic progress and the consequent rise of populist 
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politicians (Dornbusch and Edwards, 1990). If a country enters a lower long-term growth path 
public opinion, with the previous higher growth still in mind, will ultimately demand policy actions 
that causes growth to increase again. To test for such a pattern several indexes measuring 
institutional quality are tested with long and short-term GDP growth to investigate for clear 
patterns indicating that long term changes in economic activity cause institutional reform.  
 
Hypothesis 3. Co-dependency is required between new technology and institutional reform for either to have a 
long-term effect on GDP.  
So far, the theory has been that the relationship is binary; either institutional reform affects GDP, 
or long-term movements in GDP affects institutions. But it may well be that they are dependent 
on each other. For a new technology to have a full impact some institutional qualities are required 
(Lipsey, 2009). However good a disruptive innovation might be, access to financing, and 
possibilities to export and to enter new markets without too much regulation might very well be 
required. Nevertheless, it might also be the case that deregulation and easy access to capital might 
not yield a higher amount of innovation or for that matter then a higher long-term growth. To test 
for this co-dependency extra variables are created estimated as the total factor productivity growth 
multiplied by each explanatory variable. The TFP is measured as the G7 average assumed to be a 
general market leading proxy for innovation. This new variable will then show if a combination of 
the two yields a higher effect or not.  
 
Hypothesis 4. Long-term change and institutional reform is a causal relationship that only can be found within 
developed countries. 
A possible explanation of long-term changes in the economy is such that it is a phenomenon for 
developed countries that are both interacting and dependent on each other and one’s innovation 
and new technologies. It might very well be that the theory of Abramovitz (1986) still holds that 
the countries forging ahead and leading innovation are the ones affecting and driving long-wave 
movement forward, while the rest simply follows. Potentially, such a relationship does not exist for 
developing countries. Developing countries might still be struggling to get fundamental democratic 
and market-orientated institutions settled, often haunted by civil wars and economic turmoil. A 
counterargument would be that the opposite ought to occur, since developing countries have less 
to lose and more to gain by adapting quickly to innovation and thus can gain more than developed 
countries already settled and content with the status quo. This final hypothesis is tested by dividing 
the panel data into region-specific panels and then testing our first hypothesis for each sub-group.  
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4. Data and methodology  
The hypothesis testing is conducted using a dataset of 87 countries including both developed and 
developing countries (for full description of data and a list of countries see Appendix B and B). 
The selection of countries has been conducted with respect to data availability, and includes data 
in the timespan of 1984-2016. Although the timespan is limited the data generally still accounts for 
over 30 years of observations. This period is obviously in the lower range of desired time length 
but compared to previous studies this is a data-driven study and by using the method of dynamic 
panel data estimation we can still hope to find valuable conclusions from the last structural change 
cycle (Berry, 1991; Schön, 2006; Perez, 2007). If evidence is found then we will be able to state that 
such results account for the latest long-change cycle and not for a universal period. If there are 
long-term effects such can thus still be found, but if they are not found then we can state that no 
such effects exist. As the theory of long-term movement state that it is a binary phenomenom, 
either it exists or it does not, so if no proof is found for the latest period then the theory does not 
hold (Schön, 2006: Perez, 2007). The wide range of countries ought to increase the robustness of 
our tests.  
 
The econometric hypothesis testing is computed using a linear dynamic panel-data model where 
the unobserved panel-level effects are correlated with the lags of the dependent variable. The model 
also accounts for moving-average correlation in the idiosyncratic, or unsystemic, errors, which 
means that country-specific effects will not affect the estimate (Baltagi, 2013). In other words, if a 
single country experiences an anomalistic and rare event this one deviation will not affect the total 
estimate. To capture the effects of long waves without risking omitted results the model measures 
both the long- and short-term effects. These effects are computed by dividing our initial variable 
into a long-term moving average effect and the short-term deviation from this long-term effect.  
 
We test for real GDP growth as the dependent variable, but also include five separate institutional 
indexes. GDP is measured as real GDP at constant 2011 national prices with the source from Penn 
World tables. To test hypothesis 3, we also use TFP and this is measured as TFP at constant 
national prices (index 2011=1) gathered through the Penn World tables. Our index estimate 
political institutions (IRCG political risk index), economic institutions (ICRG economic risk index), 
economic freedom index (Fraser institute of economic freedom), the economic openness (KOF 
index of trade and capital restrictions), and finally the degree of globalisation (the KOF index of 
political globalisation). These indexes have been used in several previous studies to measure 
institutional quality (Fölster and Henrekson, 2001; Catrinescu, Leon-Ledesma, Piracha and Quillin, 
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2009; de Haan, Sturm and Zandberg, 2009; Bergh and Karlsson, 2010; Andersson, 2016). Each 
index can be expected to affect growth in its own way: political quality describes the quality and 
trustworthiness of contracts and official governance, often crucial for a function market where 
contracts can be enforced and the government can be trusted (Dixit, 2009). Economic institutions 
estimate the stability of fiscal and monetary policy – perhaps an area where dysfunctional policies 
cause larger negative externalities than the positive outcomes of sound policies. Uncontrolled 
inflation is such an example of a factor causing negative effects on growth (Bergh and Karlsson, 
2010). Economic and regulatory freedom is generally regarded as a contributing factor to the ease 
of starting and developing companies and thus for entrepreneurs and growth to thrive (Dawson, 
1998). As there is some debate on the effects of globalisation this paper uses two sub-indexes of 
the KOF Globalisation index. Economic openness and growth is a relationship easier understood 
through fundamental macroeconomic theory and previous research has found evidence for such a 
relationship (Lee Ha et al., 2004). Some studies also find evidence for a causal relationship between 
political openness and growth and therefore this index is also included (Dreher, 2006).  
 
The Fraser index measures the degree to which the policies and institutions of countries are 
supportive of economic freedom. Measuring the degree of personal choice, voluntary exchange, 
freedom to enter markets and compete, and security of individuals and privately-owned property. 
A higher score indicates a greater level of economic freedom. As the Fraser index only offers data 
in five year intervals leading onto year 2000, annual data has been estimated using linear 
interpolation. The index measuring Political Risk is constructed such that the healthier the 
institutions, the higher the score. The same applies to the index measuring Economic Risk, which 
is based on sub-indexes measuring debt levels, inflation and the current account, where a healthier 
financial system is rewarded with a lower risk and thus a higher score. These three indexes will 
measure the degree of liberalization of markets and competition, the robustness and accountability 
of a country’s political system and finally the stability of its financial institutions such as quality of 
a central bank and treasury. The two KOF globalisation indexes are separated between political 
and economic openness. The political index is measured primarily on international diplomatic 
engagement and the economic index measures how open a country is towards foreign trade and 
capital movement, these two also reward a higher degree of openness with a higher score. Table 2 
summarizes the sub-indexes constructing each index.  
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Table 2. Institutional indexes and their respective sub-indexes  
ICRG political risk 
index 
ICRG economic 
risk index 
Fraser index of 
economic freedom  
KOF trade and capital 
restrictions  KOF political globalisation  
Government stability  Inflation Size of government* Mean tariff Number of embassies and high 
commissions in the country  
Socioeconomic 
stability 
GDP per capita* Legal system and 
property rights  
Hidden import barriers  Number of international 
organizations that the country is 
a member of 
Investment profile  GDP growth* Sound money*  Taxes on international 
trade  
 
Internal conflict  Budget balance Freedom to trade 
internationally  
Capital controls  Number of UN peace keeping 
missions that the country 
participates in 
External conflict  Current Account as 
% of GDP 
Regulation 
  
Corruption  
    
Military in politics  
    
Religious tensions  
    
Law and order  
    
Ethnic tensions  
    
Democratic 
accountability  
    
Bureaucratic 
accountability  
        
Sub-indexes marked with * have been excluded from the index in the empirical analysis because they measure the 
same variable as our dependent variable and the economic outcome rather than reforms controlled by the 
policymaker.  
Source: Andersson, 2016 
 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 show the descriptive statistics for our variables. In general, we can see that political risk is 
lower than economic risk, indicating that the development of democracy and stable governmental 
functions has been less successful than that of economic institutions. The opposite is true when it 
comes to globalisation, as countries tend to be more politically rather than economically open to 
other countries. In general, the standard deviations from mean are quite modest but for GDP 
growth and the control variable education expenditures, who show high standard deviations. 
Although we use data for countries with a high degree of economic and cultural diversity, each 
country’s individual data shows robustness, and in general our data shows no signs of extreme 
anomalies.  
 
  
Innovation and institutions: a symbiotic marriage? 
 19 
Table 3. Country average volatility and general statistics of test data 
Variable Mean 
Standard deviation  
(actual and share of mean) Observations 
TFP 0,4% 0,3% N= 1914 
  82% n= 87 
   T= 22 
GDP 4% 5% N= 2610 
  147% n= 87 
   T= 30 
Political risk 5,6 1,3 N= 2871 
  23% n= 87 
   T= 33 
Economic risk 7,6 2,0 N= 2523 
  27% n= 87 
   T= 29 
Freedom index 6,3 1,5 N= 2547 
  23% n= 85 
   T= 30 
KOF Trade and capital  59,2 23,0 N= 2559 
  39% n= 83 
   T= 31 
KOF Political 
globalisation 69,7 19,0 N= 2621 
  27% n= 85 
   T= 31 
Ecucation expenditures 4,7 2,7 N= 2194 
  57% n= 85 
    T= 26 
 
Testing for heteroscedasticity using a Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroscedasticity in fixed 
effect regression model indicated presence of heteroscedasticity. Therefore, robust standard errors 
have been introduced into our model (See Appendix C). 
 
Unit root tests has been conducted via the Fisher-type test as we are dealing with unbalanced data. 
Here the test has been conducted using both Augmented Dickey-Fuller test and the Phillips-Perron 
unit-root tests as the methodology might affect the result (Choi, 2001). In the ADF test, the lag 
length is included to solve the problem of autocorrelation. The regression also includes first 
differences as we are dealing with fixed effects. The unit root testing showed general significant 
results to reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity and thus that the series are stationary in their 
original form (for full results see Appendix D). To test for not only correlation but causation we 
also test for pairwise Granger causality (for full results see Appendix E) finding significant causation 
between our explanatory and dependent variables.   
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Table 4. Contemporaneous correlation coefficients  
  GDP TFP Polrisk Ecrisk FreeX KOFTCR KOFPG EduExp 
GDP 1.0000        
TFP -0.0341 1.0000       
Polrisk -0.0272 0.1103*** 1.0000      
Ecrisk 0.0892*** 0.1412*** 0.6266*** 1.0000     
FreeX 0.2873***  -0.0451** 0.2179*** 0.2920*** 1.0000    
KOFTCR 0.1149*** 0.2558*** 0.7058*** 0.5074*** 0.2483*** 1.0000   
KOFPG 0.2072*** -0.0321 0.4770*** 0.4130*** 0.2856*** 0.4443*** 1.0000  
EduExp  -0.0884***  0.1113***  -0.0484**  -0.0973*** 0.0733*** -0.0323  -0.0434** 1.0000 
*, ** and *** denote significant estimates at the 10, 5 and 1 % significance levels respectively 
Each variable is defined as the relative change from the previous period   
 
As seen from Table 4 our Contemporaneous correlation coefficients showed significant correlation 
allowing us to move forward with our estimate.  
 
4.2. Model specification 
Estimating the effects of institutions on countries, there are plenty of time-invariant characteristics 
unique to the individual country that should not be correlated with other individual characteristics. 
So, as each country is different we allow for fixed individual effects. The combination of fixed 
country specific effects and a dynamic model might result in an endogeneity problem. This is solved 
by using a regression with a robust GMM estimator (Windmeijer, 2005; Bund and Windmeijer, 
2010; Andersson, 2016). The Arellano-Bond (1991) and Arellano-Bover (1995)/Blundell-Bond 
(1998) dynamic panel estimators are general estimators that are appropriate when a model has short 
time periods and larger country dimensions, a linear functional relationship, a dynamic dependent 
variable, fixed effects and risks heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation.  
 
The model is specified as a system of equations, one per time-period, meaning that time-specific 
effects are adjusted for. Each variable is estimated as the relative change from its previous period 
and GDP is estimated as real GDP.  The long-term effects are computed using the same technique 
as in spirit of Berry (1998) and Andersson (2016) by changing the data from yearly to a nine-year 
moving average, computed as the average over the yearly observations. Such nine-year averages 
would account for the longer swings in the economy as GDP (Berry, 1991). By using nine-year 
data, short-term fluctuations are being removed, allowing the analysis to focus on the long-term 
movement. This allows us to estimate both short-term deviations and long-term effects. The first 
period is between 1984-1993 and the final between 2007-2016 or 2005-2014, depending on the 
data source.  
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There are several ways of estimating long-term effects on GDP but to avoid a debate on the 
estimation technique itself, long-term effects has been calculated as a weighted 9-year average 
(Berry, 1991; in spirit of Andersson, 2017). Using a weighted-average, instead of for example 
Wavelet analysis, allows us to fix the long-term estimate as this is what we are investigating. By 
using our decided method, we do not risk causing multiple definitions of wave-lengths and thus 
we would not risk assessing shorter or longer periods (Liu, 2011). Another possible way would be 
to use a Hodrick-Prescott filter to create a multiplier of time-trend. This has been discarded as such 
a method would risk producing series with spurious dynamic relations that have no basis in the 
underlying data-generating process (Hamilton, 2017). The computed long and short-term variables 
are specified as  
 
𝑋𝑖𝑡 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑆 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝐿                         (1) 
 
𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝐿 =
1
𝑁
 ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑡−𝑖
4
𝑖=−4
                 (2) 
 
𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑆 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡 − 𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝐿                          (3) 
 
 
where 𝑋𝑖𝑡 denotes the original value of the variable and the short and long-term effects are denoted 
𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑆  and   𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝐿 . The short-term effect is computed as the deviation of the variable at time t from its 
long-term trend. The trend is computed as a weighted average between the current year and four 
years back and four years forth. This computation allows us to capture longer movements and filter 
for short-term deviations. The basic model is specified as 
 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡−1
𝑆 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡−1
𝐿 + 𝛽4𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡−1
𝑆 + 𝛽5𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡−1
𝐿
+ 𝛿𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡         (4) 
 
where i denotes country, t denotes time, index denotes one of the four institutional indexes, 𝛿𝑖𝑡  is 
a country-specific effect, and 𝛽2, 𝛽3 are the parameters that we are interested in. As our hypothesis 
suggests, there might hide a reversed causality as institutions might cause changes in GDP in a first 
step resulting that the change in the dependent variable cause a change in institutions. As the 
explanatory variables are all estimated with a time-lag we minimize the risk of endogeneity. A 
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problem that could arise with economic time-series data is time-specific effects who cannot be 
explained by our variables, such events are excluded for by imposing time dummies for each 
estimated year1.  
To test for validity and robustness of our model we test for the Wald Chi-squared and the Arellano-
Bond test for autocorrelation. The GMM estimator can produce consistent estimates only if the 
moment conditions used are valid. There is, however, no method to test if the moment conditions 
from an exactly identified model are valid beyond doubt but it is possible to test whether the 
overidentifying moment conditions are valid. The Wald Chi-square test is used to test the null 
hypothesis of all coefficients except for the constant being zero (Arellano and Bond, 1991). The 
Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation test the null hypothesis that the errors in the first difference 
regression exhibit no autocorrelation.  
 
5. Econometric analysis 
Three different model specifications are being used in ranking order of the hypotheses. The first 
model estimates the effects institutions have on Gross Domestic Product. Then five different 
models are being set up controlling for the long-term effects GDP has on reform of institutions. 
Finally a interacting model is constructed to try and capture the co-dependence between innovation 
and institutional reform. Each model includes fixed time- and country specific effects. The models 
are all dynamic and therefore estimate the lagged effect of both the dependent and the explanatory 
variables (Andersson, 2017). As the dependent variable GDP might also be affected by the human 
capital level of the labour force, a control variable measuring government expenditure on education 
as a share of total GDP has been added (Solow, 1956; Florida, 2002). General government 
expenditure on education2 is expressed as a percentage of GDP. General government usually refers 
to local, regional and central governments, the data is summarised by UNESCO and where there 
are missing values these have been estimated using linear interpolation.  
 
Hypothesis 1.  
When estimating and testing our first hypothesis we test using our initial model  
 
                                                 
1 As the results are of no interest for this essay we do not show these results. These can happily be distributed by the 
author upon request.  
2 Current, capital, and transfer expenditures and the ratio also includes expenditure funded by transfers from 
international sources to government. 
Innovation and institutions: a symbiotic marriage? 
 23 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡−1
𝑆 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡−1
𝐿 + 𝛽4𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡−1
𝑆 + 𝛽5𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡−1
𝐿
+ 𝛿𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡         (4) 
 
where GDP is tested as the dependent variable of institutional change. We use five indexes: 
political- and economic risk, freedom index, political- and economic openness, each estimated as 
short- and long-term.  
 
Table 5. Regression results for Hypothesis 1.  
  Variable Coefficient 
  Political risk, t-1 .1137003 
   (.0803338) 
  Economic risk, t-1 .0263755 
   (.0816263) 
  Freedom index, t-1 .2608746 
Long-term effects  (.2614115) 
  KOF Trade and capital, t-1 .0328362** 
   (.0156003) 
  KOF Political globalisation, t-1 .0623125 
   (.1079742) 
  Education expenditures, t-1 .2304161** 
    (.1000686) 
  Political risk, t-1 .0157567** 
   (.0079328) 
  Economic risk, t-1 .0327835 
   (.0303745) 
  Freedom index, t-1 -.0491273 
Short-term effects  (.0916621) 
  KOF Trade and capital, t-1 -.0034199 
   (.0049902) 
  KOF Political globalisation, t-1 -.0171349 
   (.0131681) 
  Education expenditures, t-1 -.0474961 
    (.0291353) 
  Dependent variable, t-1  -.2035193*** 
   (.028353) 
  Constant .0224114*** 
   (.0085288) 
  AR (1) 0.0011 
  AR (2) 0.0317 
  Wald chi2 859.96 (13) 
  Prob 0.000 
*, ** and *** denote significant estimates at the 10, 5 and 1 % significance levels respectively 
Standard errors are presented in parentheses below the parameter estimates  
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p-Values are presented for the AR-tests and the degrees of freedom for the Wald test are presented in parenthesis  
 
We find significant results capital (at 5 % significance) suggesting that improved openness to 
trade and investments in education have positive long-term effects on GDP. Short-term 
estimates indicate that political institutional reform show a minor growth enhancing effect (at the 
5 % significance level).  
Hypothesis 2.  
To test hypothesis 2 our model is reversed and the institution, described as index, will be the 
dependent variable of long-change movements in the economy, measured as long- and short-
term GDP growth. The two long- and short-term effects are calculated as described in equation 
1-3, allowing us to estimate long-term GDP growth. Each of our five indexes are estimated 
including a lagged dependent variable 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1
𝑆 + 𝛽3𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1
𝐿 + 𝛿𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡         (5) 
 
where we are investigating particularly the estimates 𝛽2, 𝛽3. 
 
Table 6. Regression results H2 test 
    Political risk Economic risk 
Freedom 
index 
KOF Trade 
and capital 
KOF Political 
globalisation 
Long-term 
effects GDP, t-1 .1188616 .6373045 .0904811 .6449342 -.0694952 
   (.2410495) (.5970928) (.130027) (.6091517) (.2238668) 
Short-term 
effects GDP, t-1  -.1387352** -.0992647 -.013869 -.084737 -.0168486 
    (.0671178) (.1871163) (.0379004) (.1146523) (.0425677) 
  Dependent variable, t-1  -.8958483***  -.7028899*** .0128859  -.6818458***  -.8191155*** 
   (.0237398) (.039196) (.1736673) (.0291161) (.0426447) 
  Constant .0911052*** .0961631*** .0029597 .2334511*** .1429982*** 
   (.017473) (.0247716) (.0047083) (.0552607) (.0176583) 
  AR (1) 0.0002 0.2453 0.0150 0.0003 0.0283 
  AR (2) 0.0000 0.0000 0.7356 0.0600 0.0000 
  Wald chi2 4081.12 (23) 1536.68 (23) 178.37 (23) 1883.28 (23) 2262.65 (23) 
  Prob 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
*, ** and *** denote significant estimates at the 10, 5 and 1 % significance levels respectively 
Standard errors are presented in parentheses below the parameter estimates  
p-Values are presented for the AR-tests and the degrees of freedom for the Wald test are presented in parenthesis  
 
We only find significant results (at the 5 % significance level) for short-term GDP growth and 
political risk. Aside from this we do not find any significant relationship, meaning that the second 
hypothesis is rejected; long-term economic change does not seem to have a profound effect on 
institutional change.  
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Hypothesis 3.  
As there might be patterns of long-term change in GDP not caused by institutions but rather by 
an exogenous cyclical pattern our third hypothesis test for the interaction between innovation, with 
total factor productivity as a proxy for innovation, and institutional quality’s effect on GDP. We 
therefore estimate both if there needs to be interaction for institutions to influence GDP growth 
and in the same time what sort of institutions that best utilise long-term movements in innovation 
and TFP to enhance growth. Our new model estimates both the individual short- and long-term 
effects of institutions just as well as the two period effects for the interacting variable with TFP 
estimated as G7 average TFP annual growth.  
  
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡−1
𝑆 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡−1
𝐿 + 𝛽4𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡−1
𝑆 + 𝛽5𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡−1
𝐿 +
𝛽6𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡−1
𝑆 ∗ 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡−1
𝑆 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡−1
𝐿 ∗ 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡−1
𝐿 + 𝛿𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   (6) 
 
Adding an interaction term to a model alternate the interpretation of each estimated coefficient. 
If there were no interaction term, the individual index would be interpreted as the unique effect 
of institution on GDP. But the interaction means that the effect of institutional change on GDP 
is different for different values of TFP.  The unique effect of institution on GDP is not limited to 
𝛽2 − 𝛽3, but also depends on the values of 𝛽6 − 𝛽7 and TFP. As the new variables measuring 
interaction will be very small numbers and often take on negative means we can expect large 
coefficients (for full statistic characteristics of the interacting variables see Appendix F).  
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Table 7. Regression results H3 test 
  Variable H1 result 
H3 result (lone 
variable) 
H3 results 
(variable*TFP) 
  Political risk, t-1 .1137003 -.0151932 31.14093** 
   (.0803338) (.0700913) (15.34896) 
  Economic risk, t-1 .0263755 .0988481  -25.29514** 
   (.0816263) (.0850948) (11.8977) 
  Freedom index, t-1 .2608746 .6327032*** -54.83527 
   (.2614115) (.2115555) (45.35611) 
Long-term 
effects KOF Trade and capital, t-1 .0328362** .0511934*** -3.280754 
   (.0156003) (.0195166) (2.601088) 
  KOF Political globalisation, t-1 .0623125 -.0663679 21.64229 
   (.1079742) (.0835502) (16.94554) 
  Education expenditures, t-1 .2304161** .0920511 -5.490079 
    
(.1000686) 
(.1372231) (20.88243) 
  Political risk, t-1 .0157567** .0213639 -1.362015 
   (.0079328) (.0147354) (1.691643) 
  Economic risk, t-1 .0327835 .0271318 -4.985089 
   (.0303745) (.022576) (4.110024) 
  Freedom index, t-1 -.0491273 -.0071181 -28.09926 
   (.0916621) (.0949071) (34.8407) 
Short-term 
effects KOF Trade and capital, t-1 -.0034199 .0022531 1.148095 
   (.0049902) (.0038675) (.930382) 
  KOF Political globalisation, t-1 -.0171349 -.0212367 3.484436 
   (.0131681) (.0150854) (2.439927) 
  Education expenditures, t-1 -.0474961  -.0395738* 6.300019 
   
(.0291353) 
(.0241413) (5.901892) 
  Dependent variable, t-1  -.2035193***  -.1137132*** 
   (.028353) (.0372355)  
  Constant .0224114*** .0140084**  
   (.0085288) (.0063162)  
  AR (1) 0.0011 0.0183  
  AR (2) 0.0317 0.0601  
  Wald chi2 859.96 (13) 1356.46 (43) 
  Prob 0.000 0.0000   
*, ** and *** denote significant estimates at the 10, 5 and 1 % significance levels respectively 
Standard errors are presented in parentheses below the parameter estimates  
p-Values are presented for the AR-tests and the degrees of freedom for the Wald test are presented in 
parenthesis  
 
Testing for interdependence reveal several interesting results as the model drops the TFP-variables 
due to collinearity. We no longer find any long-term effects of educational expenditures. Instead 
we find relationships between long-term change in both regulatory freedom and openness to trade 
Innovation and institutions: a symbiotic marriage? 
 27 
(at the 1 % significant level). With our new variables measuring the interaction-relationship between 
TFP and the index we find significant results (at the 5 % significance level) for both political- and 
economic institutional quality. The coefficients show large number in line with expectations as the 
interaction variables show very small numbers compared to the dependent variable. Short-term 
coefficients indicate no relationship between the interacting index variable and GDP. 
 
As our estimates significantly change based on the developed interacting model our third 
hypothesis is strengthened as there are evidence that there is a co-dependence required for long-
term change in innovation and institutions to influence economic activity.  
 
Hypothesis 4.  
Long-term change is often found for developed countries (Berry, 1991: Berry, Kim and Kim, 1993; 
Schön, 2006) so it might very well be that our panel data, including both developed and developing 
countries, miss long-term effects as such is non-existing among developing countries. To test for 
this fourth hypothesis, we use our initial model (equation 4) and test for different sets of panel 
data, now sorted for the G7 countries, continent and a specific set of USA, Japan, Canada and 
Australia.  
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Table 8. Regression results H4 continental testing  
  Variable 
World  
(H1 results) G7 
Europe 
USA, JPN, 
CAN & AUS Asia Africa Middle east 
  Political risk, t-1 .1137003 .1765627** .1449988*** .0959381 .070699 -.0411832 .133356 
   (.0803338) (.0881624) (.0453204) (.0767371) (.0952075) (.0874089) (.194129) 
  Economic risk, t-1 .0263755 -.0415219 .098937**  -.0594619**  -.1489895** .2036595 -.3113722 
   (.0816263) (.0296564) (.0397336) (.023939) (.0646042) (.1622922) (.2220476) 
  Freedom index, t-1 .2608746 1.063916*** -.0390737 1.495875*** .7956356** -.0581725 1.373566*** 
Long-term 
effects  (.2614115) (.324882) (.0514445) (.1884551) (.3960763) (.0766795) (.5023814) 
  KOF Trade and capital, t-1 .0328362** -.0071469 .0358723 -.0014079 .0042818 .102287  -.5802881*** 
   (.0156003) (.0783534) (.0429351) (.1039972) (.0119031) (.0969216) (.1750489) 
  KOF Political globalisation, t-1 .0623125 -.0067483  -.1112872*** .0106808 .2444406** -.272485 2.30271*** 
   (.1079742) (.0827396) (.0323054) (.1113697) (.0955396) (.1775625) (.6925649) 
  Education expenditures, t-1 .2304161** .0773244* .1500833 .0864811  -.192545*** .3105246*** .233945* 
    
(.1000686) 
(.1464407) (.1053283) (.2265438) (.0543679) (.0957197) (.124241) 
  Political risk, t-1 .0157567** -.0054951 .0058656 .0062495 .023686 .0442926*  -.1000149*** 
   (.0079328) (.0199892) (.0057646) (.0160091) (.0248979) (.0257158) (.016015) 
  Economic risk, t-1 .0327835  -.0235211** .0126487 -.0250701 .0030572  -.078727** .1534637*** 
   (.0303745) (.011607) (.0095867) (.0299083) (.0164923) (.0366456) (.0423191) 
  Freedom index, t-1 -.0491273 .2734756** .0196257 .2346423 .20585 .0180409  -.7315452*** 
Short-term 
effects  (.0916621) (.1150242) (.0152289) (.163021) (.1322365) (.0708713) (.1613049) 
  KOF Trade and capital, t-1 -.0034199 .0649401** -.0045747 .0641213 -.0050914 .0531821  -.0354573*** 
   (.0049902) (.0315041) (.0045227) (.048874) (.0039015) (.0375956) (.01046) 
  KOF Political globalisation, t-1 -.0171349 -.0188855 .0026072 -.0071659 .0092494 .0167197 .0329923 
   (.0131681) .0257021 (.0079417) (.0285031) (.0275456) (.0222206) (.0212847) 
  Education expenditures, t-1 -.0474961 .0873904*** .0102207 .0544904 .0020002 -.0911312  -.1093948** 
    
(.0291353) 
(.0211988) (.0115028) (.0371618) (.0340637) (.0800759) (.0450351) 
  Dependent variable, t-1  -.2035193*** .6065813*** .3087226** .5923806*** .1628132** -.0785898  -.1045713*** 
   (.028353) (.0403473) (.1276847) (.1020782) (.075019) (.1100028) (.0127354) 
  Constant .0224114*** .0011683 .0126087*** .0054324 .0349979*** .0367845*** .0099573 
   (.0085288) .0018095 (.0030497) (.0044867) (.0077086) (.0075193) (.0123208) 
  AR (1) 0.0011 0.0351 0.0024 0.0509 0.0029 0.0109 0.0626 
  AR (2) 0.0317 0.7301 0.3190 0.6875 0.1752 0.5998 0.9238 
  Wald chi2  859.96 (13) 18.39 538.06 62.41  223.86 100.49 368.23 
  Prob 0.000 0.0025 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
*, ** and *** denote significant estimates at the 10, 5 and 1 % significance levels respectively 
Standard errors are presented in parentheses below the parameter estimates  
p-Values are presented for the AR-tests and the degrees of freedom for the Wald test are presented in parenthesis  
 
Testing for continent specific effects reveal several interesting results. Both the G7 countries and 
Europe show significant (at the 5 % and 1 % significance level) results for political risk, a result 
not found for any other group. Europe seem to lose from political openness as this long-term 
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coefficient show a negative result. On the other hand, long-term regulatory freedom show 
significant results for each group but Europe and Africa. No significant long-term results were 
found for Africa while institutional change has effect on the other continents growth. Results that 
make it hard to reject the hypothesis that long-term change primarily is a phenomenon affecting 
developed countries. 
 
6. Analysis  
After several tests, some results and deductions can be discussed. First, we look at our first 
hypothesis, that improved institutional quality cause long-term improvements in the economy. The 
few significant results that were found suggested that openness to trade and movement of capital 
have positive long-term effects on GDP. Our results indicate little further proof to confirm our 
hypothesis 1 that institutional reform cause long-term improvements in growth.  
 
When testing hypothesis 2, whether long-changes in the economy cause growth enhancing 
institutional reform, even fewer evidence was found reinforcing the hypothesis. No significant 
results were found for long-term GDP growth or any index, making it hard to imply that long-term 
change in the economy influences institutional quality. The only variable showing significant results 
was short-term GDP and political institutions. Besides from this we do not find any significant 
relationship, meaning that the second hypothesis is rejected; long-term change in GDP does not 
seem to have a profound effect on institutional change. The result indicates that such a 
phenomenon is not universal and might only be found in country-specific examples (Berry, Elliott, 
Harpham and Kim, 1998). The lack of variables could result in an omitted variable bias, but this 
does not occur as our tests show few significant results.  
 
Hypothesis 3 altered our results from the testing of hypothesis 1. Long-term effects of improved 
regulatory freedom were now found significant. Openness to trade remained a significant 
contributor to long-term change, as from our first regression. However, the interesting findings are 
the ones from the interacting coefficients between change in index and TFP. Both political and 
economic institutional reform, multiplied by TFP change, has significant (at the 5 % significance 
level) effects on long-term growth. In other words, growth-enhancing reforms of macroeconomic 
institutions coupled with improved institutional qualities on such as rule of law, transparent 
governing and reliable regulatory frameworks result in long-term improvements in GDP related to 
technological change and disruptive innovation. This gives strength to the argument that a stable 
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and open business climate fosters growth as investments and entrepreneurs occurs without 
excessive regulatory restrictions and at low political risk (Berry, 1991; Schön, 2006; Bergh and 
Karlsson, 2010). The negative coefficient for long-term economic risk interacting with TFP growth 
could be explained by the fact that a large proportion of the panel data show negative coefficients, 
indicating that although a temporary decline in institutional quality of TFP-growth the long-term 
effect of the two is still positive. Such a relationship is reinforced by the fact that the short-term 
mean for the interacting economic risk variable show a negative average. The sole long-term index 
measuring openness to trade remains significantly positive and thus reinforcing previous research 
that trade has a positive effect on GDP (Lee Ha et al., 2004). Short-term coefficients indicate no 
relationship between the interacting model estimate and GDP. As our estimates significantly 
change based on the developed interacting model our third hypothesis is confirmed, as there is 
evidence of co-dependence required for long-term change in innovation and institutions to 
influence economic activity.  
 
The tests of our fourth hypothesis, that long-term change and institutional reform is a causal 
relationship that only can be found within developed countries, discovered several noteworthy 
results. Only the G7 countries and Europe show significant results for political risk. This implies, 
from our third regression with the interacting variables, that such a relationship is truly dependent 
on a certain level of economic development. Long-term regulatory freedom shows significant 
results for each group but Europe and Africa. The estimate for the smallest group, consisting of 
the four countries, describe a negative relationship between economic risk and growth, perhaps 
can this be explained by the fact that both Japan and USA have been struggling with growth and 
debt levels for some time (Summers, 2016). Interestingly the results for the Middle east show just 
how dependent the continent is on foreign exports in commodities, finding long-term significant 
results for political and economic openness and regulatory freedom and short-term results for 
political and economic risk, regulatory freedom and openness to trade. Recent years volatility and 
instability can clearly be said to influence the continents ability to grow economically. No significant 
long-term results were found for Africa while institutional change has effect on the other 
continents’ growth rates. These results confirm the hypothesis that long-term change primarily is 
a phenomenon affecting developed countries. This can be further analysed as the results suggest 
that reforms increasing regulatory freedom and increase of trade lose their growth enhancing 
impact on developed countries. Although Europe’s result should be analysed bearing in mind that 
EU has strict restrictions on how much autonomy a country has in terms of economic openness. 
The results from testing for hypothesis 4 are not far from the results of Bergh and Karlsson (2010) 
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who did not find either of the KOF Index of Globalisation to be important in explaining growth. 
It could also very well be explained by the fact that these indexes primarily measure the differences 
between open market-orientated and closed planned-economies, meaning that when comparing 
between relatively open economies the differences are too small.  
 
Combining our results, a certain pattern seems to hold indicating that increased regulatory freedom 
combined with a stable political system is the best foundation for stable growth. This supports 
previous findings suggesting that economic freedom both have a direct effect on total factor 
productivity and an indirect effect on investment (Dawson, 1998). If the country is highly 
dependent on commodity exports, then developing openness to trade and stable economic and 
political institutions, just as regulatory freedom, is especially effective in creating long-term growth. 
For a developed country to not just enjoy average growth, but also reap the benefits from disruptive 
technological innovations there is a clear need for stable and efficient fiscal- and monetary policy 
combined with trustworthy and reliable political institutions.  
 
Naturally there are risks pertaining to inaccurate results and erroneous misinterpretation of such. 
The short time-period of the dataset is a limitation, and thus a longer time series would add further 
strength to the analysis. A large proportion of the tests also runs the risk of a high degree of 
autocorrelation. The Arellano-Bond testing of autocorrelation also indicate presence of second 
order autocorrelation in several of our regressions. Such a scenario is to some extent almost 
certainly true as we estimate the total impact of a relatively few number of variables on the total 
economic activity. Therefore, it is just as complicated to construct a model including each and every 
variable affecting GDP without losing all likelihood of finding significant results. The other way 
could also very well be of relevance as the Wald Chi-square test indicate that we have overidentified 
the moment conditions. The region-specific results could indicate that our model is not correctly 
specified as we receive so various results – especially regarding Africa, a continent with more 
volatility among our variables which ought to increase the estimation. Discussions on exactly what 
variables to include in a GDP growth model could pose a draft for a time machine and this paper 
has based its modelling on previous literature (Fölster and Henrekson, 2001; Catrinescu, Leon-
Ledesma, Piracha and Quillin, 2009; de Haan, Sturm and Zandberg, 2009; Bergh and Karlsson, 
2010; Andersson, 2016).  
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If there is a desire to investigate specific institutional reforms and their effects on GDP further a 
recommendation would be to investigate for the respective sub-indexes and their effect on 
economic activity using the same modelling.  
 
7. Conclusion  
Since the birth of capitalism, long-term structural changes have affected society in numerous ways, 
and waves of disruptive innovation continue to challenge the way we live and produce (Berry, 
1991). This paper has sought to find evidence that long-changes either affect or are affected by 
institutional quality. The conclusion is not singular nor absolute but after conducting several tests 
and by including variables affecting the degree of exposure to other countries’ economies, the 
strongest evidence is that long-changes in the economy cause little institutional change. As western 
countries continue to debate the benefits and costs of openness and trade this paper find that a 
country with a higher degree of openness, especially when it comes to low tariffs and credit 
regulations, benefits from increased economic institutional quality. This connection, where 
openness improves economic institutional quality, which in turn positively affects GDP shows that 
although the advantages of openness might not always appear clearly, they are indeed present. 
Furthermore, this paper shows that high economic and political institutional quality, and openness 
to trade and capital nurture long-term innovation-driven growth. Or as Schumpeter might have 
put it: the best way to catch the wave would be through stable political and economic institutions 
and an open mind to free movement of both products and capital.  
 
In summary, we find that institutional reforms have growth-enhancing effects on GDP. However, 
the appropriate reforms depend on whether long- or short-term growth is desired, whether a 
country seeks to benefit from long-term disruptive innovations, its level of development, and its 
level of dependency on natural resources. The causal relationship is found to be from institutional 
reform to long-term economic movement rather than the other way around.  
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APPENDIX  
 
APPENDIX A - Data 
 
Penn World Tables 
GDP is estimated as real GDP at constant 2011 national prices in million 2011 US dollars.  
TFP is measured at constant national prices (index 2011=1).  
[Subtracted 5/12 2017, available online:  https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/productivity/pwt/] 
 
KOF Globalisation index  
The KOF Globalisation Index measures the three main dimensions of globalisation: economic, 
social and political. Data are available on a yearly basis for 207 countries over the period 1970 - 
2014. 
[Subtracted 3/12 2017, available online:  http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/] 
 
ICRG dataset on political, financial and economic risk  
The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) rating comprises 22 variables in three 
subcategories of risk: political, financial, and economic. A separate index is created for each of 
the subcategories.  
 
Fraser institute – Economic freedom index  
The index published in Economic Freedom of the World measures the degree to which the policies 
and institutions of countries are supportive of economic freedom. 
[Subtracted 3/12 2017, available online:  https://www.fraserinstitute.org/studies/economic-
freedom] 
 
Maddison - World GDP and population year 1-2008AD 
Has been used due to the research and data collected by Angus Maddison, university of 
Groningen. [Subtracted 24/10 2017, available online: 
http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/oriindex.htm] 
 
Bank of England  
Consumer Price Inflation in the United Kingdom, retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank 
of St. Louis, [Subtracted 1/11 2017, available online: 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIIUKA] 
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Total Factor Productivity Growth in the United Kingdom, retrieved from FRED, Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, [Subtracted 1/11 2017, available online:  
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TFPGUKA] 
 
Real Gross Domestic Product at Market Prices in the United Kingdom, retrieved from FRED, 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, [Subtracted 2/11 2017, available online:  
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/RGDPMPUKA] 
 
World Bank  
 World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files, [Subtracted 5/11 
2017, available online:  https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD] 
 
EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts 
[Subtracted 29/12 2017, available online:  http://www.euklems.net] 
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APPENDIX B - Country list
Argentina 
Australia 
Austria 
Bahrain 
Belgium 
Bolivia (Plurinational State 
of) 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Burkina Faso 
Cameroon 
Canada 
Chile 
China 
China, Hong Kong SAR 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Cyprus 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Denmark 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
Finland 
France 
Gabon 
Germany 
Greece 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
Hungary 
Iceland 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran (Islamic Republic of) 
Iraq 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Jordan 
Kenya 
Kuwait 
Luxembourg 
Malaysia 
Malta 
Mexico 
Mongolia 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua 
Nigeria 
Norway 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Poland 
Portugal 
Qatar 
Republic of Korea 
Romania 
Saudi Arabia 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Singapore 
South Africa 
Spain 
Sri Lanka 
Sudan (Former) 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Taiwan 
Thailand 
Togo 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
U.R. of Tanzania: Mainland 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Uruguay 
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of) 
Zimbabwe
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APPENDIX C –Heteroscedasticity test result 
 
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroscedasticity in fixed effect regression model 
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i 
chi2 (87)  =    2.2e+05 
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
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APPENDIX D - Unit root test results 
 
 GDP       TFP       
  Augmented Dickey-Fuller Phillips-Perron  Augmented Dickey-Fuller Phillips-Perron 
  Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Statistic p-value 
Inverse chi-squared 780.1367 0.0000 1301.6042 0.0000 12.2263 1.0000 10.6207 1.0000 
Inverse normal  -19.4868 0.0000 -27.8019 0.0000 13.9161 1.0000 14.5639 1.0000 
Inverse logit  -22.6620 0.0000 -38.3302 0.0000 13.4893 1.0000 14.2381 1.0000 
Modified inv. chi-squared 32.4923 0.0000 60.4459 0.0000 -8.6720 1.0000 -8.7580 1.0000 
          
 Political risk     Economic risk     
  Augmented Dickey-Fuller Phillips-Perron  Augmented Dickey-Fuller Phillips-Perron   
  Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Statistic p-value 
Inverse chi-squared 972.8349 0.0000 3599.1274 0.0000 235.4531 0.0013 626.9596 0.0000 
Inverse normal  -22.2758 0.0000 -52.4314 0.0000 -1.6398 0.0505 -12.1908 0.0000 
Inverse logit  -27.3546 0.0000 -107.0146 0.0000 -1.9746 0.0245 -15.6386 0.0000 
Modified inv. chi-squared 42.8220 0.0000 183.6061 0.0000 3.2942 0.0005 24.2812 0.0000 
         
 Freedom index     Education expenditures     
  Augmented Dickey-Fuller Phillips-Perron  Augmented Dickey-Fuller Phillips-Perron 
  Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Statistic p-value 
Inverse chi-squared 21.8522 1.0000 329.5264 0.0000 97.1119 1.0000 347.2229 0.0000 
Inverse normal  14.7864 1.0000 2.7224 0.9968 7.0406 1.0000 -2.5555 0.0053 
Inverse logit  15.4930 1.0000 0.1868 0.5740 7.0904 1.0000 -4.5724 0.0000 
Modified inv. chi-squared -7.9730 1.0000 8.8120 0.0000 -3.8673 0.9999 9.7774 0.0000 
         
 KOF political globalisation   KOF trade and credit index   
  Augmented Dickey-Fuller Phillips-Perron  Augmented Dickey-Fuller Phillips-Perron 
  Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Statistic p-value 
Inverse chi-squared 126.4742 0.9948 548.0212 0.0000 199.3574 0.0395 1439.1392 0.0000 
Inverse normal  4.3503 1.0000 -9.3990 0.0000 -0.0822 0.4672 -25.3639 0.0000 
Inverse logit  4.1748 1.0000 -12.1429 0.0000 -0.1273 0.4494 -41.0796 0.0000 
Modified inv. chi-squared -2.3605 0.9909 20.5011 0.0000 1.8307 0.0336 69.8726 0.0000 
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APPENDIX E - Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
 
 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.    Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
 TFP_G7_L does not Granger Cause DGDP 1827  1.20797 0.2719  
 KOFTCR_L does not Granger Cause 
POLRISK_L 1501  1.23225 0.2671 
 DGDP does not Granger Cause 
TFP_G7_L*   3.40467 0.0652  
 POLRISK_L does not Granger Cause 
KOFTCR_L***   10.2245 0.0014 
         
 POLRISK_L does not Granger Cause 
DGDP 1936  1.51058 0.2192  
 KOFPG_L does not Granger Cause 
POLRISK_L** 1533  5.59033 0.0182 
 DGDP does not Granger Cause 
POLRISK_L   0.22561 0.6349  
 POLRISK_L does not Granger Cause 
KOFPG_L   0.54225 0.4616 
         
 ECRISK_L does not Granger Cause DGDP 1408  0.30193 0.5828  
 EDUEXP_L does not Granger Cause 
POLRISK_L 1316  0.13834 0.7100 
 DGDP does not Granger Cause ECRISK_L   2.41842 0.1201  
 POLRISK_L does not Granger Cause 
EDUEXP_L**   5.26013 0.0220 
         
 KOFTCR_L does not Granger Cause 
DGDP* 1566  2.71723 0.0995  
 FREEX_L does not Granger Cause 
POLRISK_L*** 1636  7.58600 0.0059 
 DGDP does not Granger Cause 
KOFTCR_L   0.12366 0.7251  
 POLRISK_L does not Granger Cause 
FREEX_L   1.22328 0.2689 
         
 KOFPG_L does not Granger Cause 
DGDP* 1598  2.79920 0.0945  
 KOFTCR_L does not Granger Cause 
ECRISK_L 1335  0.05358 0.8170 
 DGDP does not Granger Cause KOFPG_L   0.73234 0.3923  
 ECRISK_L does not Granger Cause 
KOFTCR_L   1.69733 0.1929 
         
 EDUEXP_L does not Granger Cause 
DGDP** 1359  4.49809 0.0341  
 KOFPG_L does not Granger Cause 
ECRISK_L*** 1363  8.55048 0.0035 
 DGDP does not Granger Cause 
EDUEXP_L   0.49404 0.4822  
 ECRISK_L does not Granger Cause 
KOFPG_L***   7.97146 0.0048 
         
 FREEX_L does not Granger Cause 
DGDP*** 1700  25.4998 5.E-07  
 EDUEXP_L does not Granger Cause 
ECRISK_L 1034  1.27922 0.2583 
 DGDP does not Granger Cause FREEX_L   0.73467 0.3915  
 ECRISK_L does not Granger Cause 
EDUEXP_L   2.68050 0.1019 
         
 POLRISK_L does not Granger Cause 
TFP_G7_L*** 1762  8.89342 0.0029  
 FREEX_L does not Granger Cause 
ECRISK_L*** 1248  23.6293 1.E-06 
 TFP_G7_L does not Granger Cause 
POLRISK_L***   88.6269 1.E-20  
 ECRISK_L does not Granger Cause 
FREEX_L   0.31318 0.5758 
         
 ECRISK_L does not Granger Cause 
TFP_G7_L*** 1408  22.4970 2.E-06  
 KOFPG_L does not Granger Cause 
KOFTCR_L*** 1566  19.5523 1.E-05 
 TFP_G7_L does not Granger Cause 
ECRISK_L***   81.9168 5.E-19  
 KOFTCR_L does not Granger Cause 
KOFPG_L   0.70137 0.4025 
         
 KOFTCR_L does not Granger Cause 
TFP_G7_L 1566  0.10420 0.7469  
 EDUEXP_L does not Granger Cause 
KOFTCR_L 1148  0.39961 0.5274 
 TFP_G7_L does not Granger Cause 
KOFTCR_L***   56.3169 1.E-13  
 KOFTCR_L does not Granger Cause 
EDUEXP_L   0.77707 0.3782 
         
 KOFPG_L does not Granger Cause 
TFP_G7_L*** 1598  8.33749 0.0039  
 FREEX_L does not Granger Cause 
KOFTCR_L 1409  2.03173 0.1543 
 TFP_G7_L does not Granger Cause 
KOFPG_L***   44.8166 3.E-11  
 KOFTCR_L does not Granger Cause 
FREEX_L   0.30022 0.5838 
         
 EDUEXP_L does not Granger Cause 
TFP_G7_L** 1359  5.53229 0.0188  
 EDUEXP_L does not Granger Cause 
KOFPG_L 1177  0.14249 0.7059 
 TFP_G7_L does not Granger Cause 
EDUEXP_L***   29.4688 7.E-08  
 KOFPG_L does not Granger Cause 
EDUEXP_L   2.42271 0.1199 
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 FREEX_L does not Granger Cause 
TFP_G7_L*** 1618  17.0359 4.E-05  
 FREEX_L does not Granger Cause 
KOFPG_L** 1441  5.77643 0.0164 
 TFP_G7_L does not Granger Cause 
FREEX_L***   9.72243 0.0019  
 KOFPG_L does not Granger Cause 
FREEX_L***   14.1407 0.0002 
         
 ECRISK_L does not Granger Cause 
POLRISK_L* 1408  3.75559 0.0528  
 FREEX_L does not Granger Cause 
EDUEXP_L** 1258  6.63571 0.0101 
 POLRISK_L does not Granger Cause 
ECRISK_L    0.00134 0.9708  
 EDUEXP_L does not Granger Cause 
FREEX_L    0.05519 0.8143 
*, ** and *** denote significant estimates at the 10, 5 and 1 % significance levels 
respectively  
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APPENDIX F – Descriptive statistics TFP-interacting variable 
 
Variable Mean 
Standard deviation  
Observations 
 
(actual and share of 
mean)  
PolTFP_L 0,007% 0,020% N= 1891 
  286% n= 87 
   T= 21,7356 
     
PolTFP_S -0,011% 0,096% N= 1891 
  -874% n= 87 
   T= 21,7356 
     
EcTFP_L 0,011% 0,032% N= 1663 
  284% n= 87 
   T= 19,1149 
     
EcTFP_S -0,028% 0,142% N= 1663 
  -508% n= 87 
   T= 19,1149 
     
FrTFP_L 0,008% 0,020% N= 1747 
  243% n= 83 
   T= 21,0482 
     
FrTFP_S 0,002% 0,024% N= 1725 
  1178% n= 82 
   T= 21,0366 
     
EdTFP_L 0,005% 0,025% N= 1536 
  481% n= 83 
   T= 18,506 
     
EdTFP_S -0,013% 0,117% N= 1537 
  -895% n= 83 
   T= 18,5181 
     
KCTFP_L 0,015% 0,058% N= 1755 
  389% n= 83 
   T= 21,1446 
     
KCTFP_S -0,034% 0,173% N= 1755 
  -513% n= 83 
   T= 21,1446 
     
KPTFP_L 0,005% 0,023% N= 1799 
  455% n= 85 
   T= 21,1647 
     
KPTFP_S -0,022% 0,105% N= 1799 
  -482% n= 85 
   T= 21,1647 
 
